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ABSTRACT: The article analyzes and formalizes the Hegelian categories of the 
second part of the Logic of Being, thus concluding this first project. Hegel’s 
terminology is translated into 21st century English and the core passages 
are formalized. This article is the continuation of the first one published in 
this journal a year ago. It concludes the corrected and partially formalized 
commentary on the Logic of Being.
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RESUMO: Os autores analisam e formalizam as categorias hegelianas da 
segunda parte da Lógica do Ser, encerrando, assim, este primeiro projeto. A 
terminologia hegeliana foi transposta para o português do século XXI e as 
passagens centrais foram formalizadas. Este artigo é a continuação do primeiro, 
publicado nesta revista um ano atrás, e leva a fim e cabo o comentário corrigido 
e parcialmente formalizado da Lógica do Ser. 
Palavras-chave: Lógica de Hegel, Lógica do Ser, Formalização da Lógica de Hegel.
1 Translated into English by Luís M. Sander.
2 Full Professor at the Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos (UNISINOS). São Leopoldo, RS, Brazil.
3 Full Professot at the Universidade de Caxias do Sul (UCS). Caxias do Sul, RS, Brazil.
4 The First and Second Chapters were published in Filosofia Unisinos, Vol. 6, n. 1, jan/abr 2005.
Chapter 3 – Being-for-itself, the One and the Many, 
Repulsion and Attraction4 
1 1 3 Being-for-itself
The first book of Hegel’s Science of Logic discusses the Logic of Being, the 
second one the Logic of Essence and the third one the Logic of the Concept. Each 
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book is divided into three sections (Abschnitte), and each section (Quality, Quantity, 
Measure) in its turn is subdivided into three chapters (Kapitel). – The first (Being, 
Nothing, Becoming) and the second (Dasein, Finitude, Infinitude) chapter of the 
first part of the book, the Logic of Being, have already been dealt with. To complete 
this first part, whose main topic is Quality, we have to discuss the chapter on Be-
ing-for-itself, the One and the Many, Repulsion and Attraction.
In Being-for-itself the qualitative Being is fulfilled; it is infinite Being. The Being of the 
beginning is indeterminate. Dasein is sublated (aufgehoben), but only immediately 
sublated Being; thus it contains only the first negation, which is itself immediate; Being 
is equally preserved, and both [Being and the first Negation] are united in Dasein in a 
simple unity. But precisely for this reason they are still different from each other and 
their unity is not [dialectically] posited yet. Dasein, is therefore, the sphere of differ-
ence, of dualism, the field of finitude. Determinateness is determinateness as such, a 
relative, non-absolute being-determinate. In Being-for-itself the difference between 
Being and Determinateness or negation is posited and conciliated; Quality, Otherness, 
Limit, as well as Reality, Being-in-itself, Ought etc. are the imperfect formations of 
Negation in Being on which the difference between both [Being and Being-in-itself] 
is still based. But insofar as in Finitude the Negation became Infinitude, the posited 
Negation of Negation, it is simple relation to itself and thus in itself the conciliation 
(Ausgleichung) with Being – absolute being-determinate. (Hegel, Wissenschaft der 
Logik. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1969, vol. 1, p. 174).
This long quotation of Hegel’s text will be our point of reference for the inter-
pretation, in order to understand the transition from Being (1 1 1) to Dasein (1 1 2), 
from Dasein to Good Infinitude (1 1 2 C) and from Good Infinitude to Being-for-itself 
(1 1 3 A a) and to the issue of the One and the Many (1 1 3 A b).
1 1 3 A Being-for-itself as such
Being-for-itself, as discussed above, is Dasein with Good Finitude and Good 
Infinitude conceived again as something positive: it is the negation of negation. 
Through the first negation determinate Dasein emerges from indeterminate Being, 
and determinate Dasein proves to be Good Finitude and Good Infinitude. Through 
the second negation, the negation of negation, we leave the multiplicity of poles 
that delimit and determine each other in Dasein and return to the unity that is Be-
ing-for-itself. Thus every Being-for-itself is a Being for One, viz., Being for a One.
Let’s now translate, step by step, the heavy Hegelianism of the above quota-
tion into English.
First step: The Being of the beginning, which includes the triad made up of 
Being, Nothing and Becoming, is something indeterminate and without any con-
tent. The content – for when we actually think in our daily lives we think in terms 
of contents – must come from somewhere else. But there is no other place outside 
of the Universe of Being, Nothing and Becoming. Outside of the Universe there is 
nothing that could function as limit or determination. Thus the limit must come 
from within the Universe itself.
Second step: From where could it come? Where is there a limit or delimitation 
within the Universe? Within the Universe there is negation. It is from negation, which 
is internal to the Universe, that comes the limit, delimitation or determination, for 
every negation is a determination. Omnis determinatio est negatio.
Third step: The Being that is further determined by negation is Dasein. This 
first form of negation transforms indeterminate Being into determinate Being, viz., 
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into Dasein. But this determination is simple, i.e., something is determined by the 
negation of at least another something. And this another something is determined 
by the negation of the first something. One is determined by the other’s negation. 
In other words: Determination is a game of relations of negation between two poles. 
A father is only father if he has a son, just as the son is only son if he has a father. 
The same applies to right and left, above and below, etc.
Fourth step: The question to be raised now is whether this does not lead to the 
perverse game of Bad Finitude and Bad Infinitude. For when we conceive something 
determinate (Dasein and Finitude), we inevitably end up in the endless repetition, 
in the regressus ad infinitum. What is the first determinant? If it is determinate, 
who or what determined it? And thus ad infinitum. The same occurs if we resort to 
a progressus ad infinitum. Both processes were unmasked in the previous chapter 
as being perverse. What then should we do?
Fifth step: Determination and Delimitation are forms of negation, of a nega-
tion that is internal to the Universe. From this there emerges Dasein with its simple 
determination, i.e., with its simple negation. When we focus on the father, viz. 
something determinate, we are always pointing also to the son. But we are focusing 
on the father, we are talking about the father, and not about the son. When we say 
that the father is tall, we are not saying anything about the son’s height. In spite of 
the intimate relationship between father and son, which determines them as two 
poles, there is a big difference here. We focus on the father rather than the son, 
we speak of the father as something determinate without explicitly talking about 
the son. Thus the relationship between father and son has lost part of its priority 
and constitutive importance. The father as father, when conceived without making 
explicit reference to his relationship with his determinate son, is no longer mere 
Dasein (Dasein, Finitude, Infinitude). When the father is thus conceived as being in 
himself and for himself a Good Finitude and a Good Infinitude, he is conceived as 
a Being-for-itself. Therefore, Being-for-itself is just a simpler way of saying a Being 
with Good Finitude and Bad Infinitude. But after going through its otherness, the 
emphasis returns to the one from which we started. I.e., it is perfectly possible for 
the father to be an exemplary citizen even if the son is a scoundrel and vice-versa. 
It is as if the father has detached himself from the relationship between father and 
son (aufheben in the sense of overcoming) and is now considered by himself, in 
himself, as something that is a Being-for-itself.
1 1 3 A a Thesis: Dasein and Being-for itself
Being-for-itself, as discussed above, is Dasein with Good Finitude and Good 
Infinitude conceived again as something positive: it is the negation of negation. 
Through the first negation determinate Dasein emerges from indeterminate Being, 
and determinate Dasein proves to be of Good Finitude and Good Infinitude. Through 
the second negation, i.e., the negation of negation, we leave the multiplicity of 
poles that delimit and determine each other in Dasein and return on a higher level 
to the unity that is Being-for-itself. Thus every Being-for-itself is a Being for One, a 
being for a One.
But when we say this we return on a higher level to the problem which we 
already know of a determination that can only be made through negation. This is 
where thesis, antithesis and synthesis emerge from.
The thesis states: everything that was presupposed and must be reposited 
is a being for itself. – The thesis is false because being-for-itself, when posited by 
itself only in itself, is no longer something determinate, as it should be; in order to 
be determinate it should have an explicit negation of something other that would 
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determine it and distinguish it from everything else. What is the negation that de-
termines Being-for-itself? What is the relationship of negation?
1 1 3 A b Antithesis: Being-for-One
Being-for-itself is not treated as a relationship between two different poles 
(e.g., father and son), but as a unity turned towards something that is simply one, 
Being-for-itself is first of all a Being-for-One.
The antithesis states: everything that was presupposed and must be reposited 
is Being-for-one. The antithesis is false because it does not explicitly state which 
one this one is. Of what one are we talking here? Hegel himself already asks in the 
table of contents: Was für eines? This “one” is indeterminate, vague and devoid of 
content; thus it cannot be the constitutive pole of a negative relationship of deter-
mination. Since there is no further determination of the One, it cannot determine 
what is the Being-for-itself that we are dealing with.
1 1 3 A c Synthesis: The One
In the dialectical back and forth between determination of one by the other 
(Dasein) and determination of Being-for-itself the One, the indeterminate and void 
One, reappears as an antithetical category. Insofar as this One is indeterminate, it 
constitutes only a false antithesis. But there is a One that is not indeterminate and 
void: viz., the One that is said and expressed in the “self”. The one of the “self” 
contained in the category Being-for-itself is a One that is determinate and full of 
content. It is determined through the negation of the indeterminate One. The an-
tithetical One is indeterminate because it does not point to anything. The synthetic 
One points to the “self” of the Being-for-itself.
Thus the determinate One is the dialectical synthesis in which Dasein, the 
Being-for-itself-as-such and the Being-for-One (the indeterminate one) are an-
nulled and preserved. As we introduce the synthesis of the Being-for-itself that 
is a Being-for-the-determinate-One, which “is” the “self” of “being-for-itself”, 
the relationship that determines the Being-for-itself with the One is a negation 
in the negation: it negates the indetermination of the indeterminate One of the 
antithesis and constitutes itself, by being turned to the “self” of itself, as a reflex 
and positive relationship. The One, conceived in this manner, is the dialectical 
abbreviation of the Being that, by going through the determinations of Dasein 
and of Being-for-itself-as-such, overcomes the differences and preserves and ex-
presses the unity of the Universe.
All mediations – a typically Hegelian phrase – that we have made so far re-
peat and make explicit categories that we had already introduced and discussed 
in the comments in Formal Logic. For this reason it would be redundant to repeat 
here the formalizations made previously. The verbal explanation and the didactic 
reconstruction undertaken above should suffice. Therefore, let’s move to 1 1 3 B, 
The One and the Many, for here we can axiomatize elements that have not been 
discussed with the necessary thoroughness.
1 1 3 B The One and the Many
The One is constructed by a double determination, viz., by a negation and by 
the negation of this negation. The first negation constitutes the One as something 
different from the Other. The second negation – the negation of the negation – states 
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that this something, although different from the Other, is flexed upon itself and, 
in this reflection upon itself, is much more than the mere negation of the Other. It 
is itself, it is the One.
1 1 3 B a The One in itself
The One, being determined by a double negation, contains the relationship 
with the Other as an overcome and preserved relationship. The One became itself 
again; its being is not Dasein, but neither is it the mere relationship with the Other. 
It contains (preserves) all these categories, but it also overcomes them (aufheben). 
It overcomes them because it leaves them behind, because it no longer makes them 
explicit, because it says more than they do. It preserves them because everything 
positive that they have is contained (aufgehoben) in it, in the One. The One insofar 
as it is abstracted from the history of its constitution, from the contents that were 
sublated (aufgehoben) is thus merely a One, an indeterminate and void One. In this 
sense the One becomes again a Nothing, viz., a complete void.
The thesis states: everything that was presupposed and must be reposited is 
the One. – This thesis is obviously false because it considers the Universe as some-
thing completely void and ignores the manifoldness and richness of things that 
inhabit it.
1 1 3 B b The One and the Void
The One is the abstract relationship of negation with itself: negation of nega-
tion. When we forget Dasein, the limit, determination by the Other – which were 
sublated, overcome – what was preserved as the content of the One is a complete 
Void. – The One conceived in this way is an atom, an atom with no relation to other 
atoms, an atom that is not in a field of forces. Thus it is an atom that does not say 
anything and is the pure Void in the solipsism of its absolute oneness.
The antithesis states: everything that was presupposed and must be reposited is 
the One and the Void. – This antithesis is false, since we are in a Universe full of mani-
foldness and variegated entities, including ourselves, who are making this Logic.
1 1 3 B c Many Ones
The transition from the unique and singular One to the many Ones is logically 
made because this One is in Becoming from its very beginning. The One that is in 
becoming is the One that demands another One, which in turn demands another 
One, and so forth.
The synthesis states: everything that was presupposed and must be repos-
ited is “many Ones”, viz., the replication of the one that is reiterated ad infinitum. 
However, this infinitude, as previously demonstrated, becomes Good Infinitude 
and Good Finitude. It is something highly positive, it is the synthesis between the 
singular and unique One and the One that is replicated by constituting a numerical 
series in its Good Infinitude.
This complex and multifaceted relationship between the One and the Many 
will be formalized below. In order to avoid the repetitive turns made by Hegel from 
the positive to the negative meaning of the One and vice-versa, we introduce here 
the concepts of Good Unity and Good Multiplicity, which are constructed in similarity 
to the concepts of Good and Bad Infinitude. Thus the progressus ad infinitum in its 
bad sense is overcome.
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G) Unity: The One and the Many
G1) Refutation of the thesis ‘: x is of bad plurality’
G11) ADDITIONAL DEFINITIONS IN THE LT
Postulation
  GUn x w ∇y x = y Good Unity 
   [GUn x: x is of good unity.]
  GPl x w ∇y x ≠ y Good Plurality 
   [GPl x: x is of good plurality.]
  BUn x w ¬ GUn x  Bad Unity 
   [BUn x: x is of bad unity.]
  BPl x w ¬ GPl x  Bad Plurality 
   [BPl x: x is of bad plurality.]
G12) Conceptual Correspondences
Development
GUn x ¬ BUn x ∇y x = y ¬ Δy x ≠ y Synthesis (A)
GPl x ¬ BPl x ∇y x ≠ y ¬ Δy x = y Synthesis (T)
BUn x ¬ GUn x ¬ ∇y x = y Δy x ≠ y Antithesis
BPl x ¬ GPl x ¬ ∇y x ≠ y Δy x = y Thesis
G13) Theorem of the LT
  : GPl x       Good Plurality
Demonstration
  1 : ∇y x ≠ y      Plurality [LT]
  2 : GPl x      1 Good Plurality
G14) The thesis
Refutation
  1 : GPl x      Good Plurality [LT]
      ⎡  2 :BPl x     Hypothetical Premise (Thesis)
      ⎢  3 : ¬ GPl x    1 Bad Plurality
      ⎢  4 : GPl x ∧ ¬ GPl x  1,3 Logical Product 
      ⎢  5 : f      4 Supplementation
      ⎣  6  f       5 Elimination of the Assertion
  7 : ¬ (:GPl x)          1-6 Reduction to Absurdity
G2) Refutation of the antithesis ‘: x is of bad unity’
G21) Theorem of the LT
 : GUn x        Good Unity 
Demonstration
  1 : ∇y x = y      Non-void [LBA]
  2 : GUn x      1 Good Unity
G22) The antithesis
Refutation
  1 : GUn x       Good Unity [LT]
    ⎡  2 : BUn x     Hypothetical Premise (Antithesis)
    ⎢  3 : ¬ GUn x     2 Bad Unity
    ⎢  4 : GUn x ∧ ¬ GUn x   1,3 Logical Product 
    ⎢  5 : f       4 Supplementation
    ⎣  6  f       5 Elimination of the Assertion
  7 : ¬ (: BUn x)     2-6 Reduction to Absurdity
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G3) The synthesis of ‘: x is of good plurality’ and ‘: x is of good unity’ 
Thesis : BPl x : x (existent or inexistent) 
   is of bad plurality.
Antithesis : BUn x : x (existent or inexistent) 
   is of bad unity.
Synthesis 
(–) (T) : ¬ (: BPl x)
: Non (: x (existent or inexistent) 
   is of bad plurality).
Synthesis 
(–) (A) : ¬ (: BUn x)
: Non (: x (existent or inexistent) 
   is of bad unity).
Synthesis 
(+) (T) : GPl x 
: x (existent or inexistent) 
   is of good plurality.
Synthesis 
(+) (A) : GUn x 
: x (existent or inexistent) 
   is of good unity.
G4) Some apparently paradoxical developments of the synthesis 
G411 G421
G412 G422
G413 G423
G414 G424
G415 G425
In this formalization we can see that the issue of the One and the Many has 
the same structure that we find in the problem of the Good and Bad Finitude and 
the Good and Bad Infinitude. The philosophical kinship between both problems 
is conspicuous. – This exempts us from making many comments. If we compare 
what was discussed above about the One and the Many in natural language and 
the formalization we made, we can see that what is at stake is ultimately the same 
issue of Finitude und Infinitude, but worked out with somewhat richer concepts. 
This is precisely what Hegel intended and actually did.
1 1 3 C Repulsion and Attraction
Good Unity corresponds to Good Finitude and Good Multiplicity corresponds 
to Good Infinitude. In order to conceive the One and the Many correctly, they must 
be understood as a correlation of reciprocity in which the poles of the relationship 
are conciliated. If we do not do this, we inevitably end up either in the static one-
: GPl x
: x is of good plurality.
: Δx GPl x
: Everything 
   is of good plurality.
: ∇x GPl x
: Something 
   is of good plurality.
: ¬ ∇x BPl x
: Nothing 
   is of bad plurality.
: ¬ Δx BPl x 
: Not everything 
   is of bad plurality.
: GUn x
: x is of good unity.
: Δx GUn x
: Everything 
   is of good unity.
: ∇x GUn x
: Something 
   is of good unity.
: ¬ ∇xBUn x 
: Nothing 
   is of bad unity.
: ¬ Δx BUn x 
: Not everything 
   is of bad unity.
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ness of Parmenides’ sphere or in the disordered multiplicity of an atomism without 
the clinamen, which, by the way, nobody has ever proposed in philosophy.
However, in the system that Hegel and ourselves are proposing, the One and 
the Many (or Multiple) are always in Becoming. In other words, besides the mutu-
ally constitutive relationship between the Finite and the Infinite, between the One 
and the Multiple, one must conceive them as the One that is moving towards the 
Multiple and the Multiple that is moving towards the One. The One moving towards 
the Multiple is called Repulsion by Hegel. The Multiple moving towards the One is 
called Attraction. – Attraction is the co-belonging of all multiples, viz., of all numbers, 
to the One. Repulsion is the dynamic difference that makes the multiples different 
from the One, although all of them are, in themselves and each for itself, a One.
In Hegel attraction and repulsion constitute each other and are, for this 
reason, in balance. That is why the Universe, although it is always in Becoming, 
remains the Totality in Movement that it is, immobile and mobile at the same time. 
– But this is shown by Hegel in the habitual manner through thesis, antithesis 
and synthesis.
1 1 3 C a
The thesis states: everything that was presupposed and must be reposited is 
the exclusion of the One. – When it is stated that all the ones are just the reitera-
tion of the One, all the many ones are conceived just as multiplicity, as the One 
that each one of them is in its oneness. This movement – which is a Becoming 
– is called Repulsion. Multiplicity is affirmed without unity. The thesis is false be-
cause if there were only Repulsion, the multifarious variety of beings would never 
constitute the unity of the Universe, leaving only many ones, each one of them 
singular and unrelated with the whole which is Totality in Movement. Furthermore, 
in the Universe there would exist only One and nothing else. There would be no 
thinking I that gathers thoughts, there would be no living beings in their systemic 
unity of various sub-systems, there would be no solar system nor the galaxies in 
their organization. This has already been refuted in the first chapter both in Logic 
and natural language.
1 1 3 C b
The antithesis states: everything that was presupposed and must be reposited 
is the One of Attraction. – The antithesis states precisely the opposite of the thesis: 
there is only the singular unity of the One. In other words, the Universe is only one 
single individual, the immobile and unchangeable sphere of Parmenides. There 
would exist neither movement nor the multiplicity of things. This has already been 
logically refuted when we talked, in the beginning, about the Universe that cannot 
be empty nor contain only one individual. There the negation of the multiplicity of 
things was refuted, since the Universe we live in does not allow us to affirm unity 
without multiplicity without falling into a performative contradiction.
1 1 3 C c
The synthesis states: everything that was presupposed and must be 
reposited is the relationship between repulsion and attraction. – The synthesis 
is true because it reestablishes the balance between the One and the Many also 
in their movement of Becoming. Attraction and Repulsion constitute each other 
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and must, therefore, be in balance. It is philosophically necessary that there is 
a balance between them, since one is defined by the other in a good and virtu-
ous circularity.
In view of the arguments that have been presented, cosmologists would 
ask whether the Universe, according to this theory, can have begun in a Big Bang 
and whether it can finish in a Big Crush. Or else the Universe would have to be 
eternal, an eternal balance between Attraction and Repulsion. – When cosmolo-
gists talk about the Universe, they talk as representatives of a particular science 
that studies this Universe where we actually live. Most physicists – but not all of 
them – argue today for the theory of an initial Big Bang and many of them for 
the theory of a final Big Crush. Empirical evidence taken from our factual Uni-
verse seems to point in this direction. But from the philosophical point of view 
as above discussed there would have to be a perfect balance between attraction 
and repulsion. This would lead us to have a philosophical sympathy with the 
theses of those physicists who state (a) either that our World had a beginning 
and will have an end, but that the Universe as such, the big and total Universe, 
has neither beginning nor end and will remain eternally; (b) or that after each 
Big Crush there will be a new Big Bang.
In the logical formalization the issue of the One and the Many becomes 
the issue of Good Unity and Bad Unity, of Good Multiplicity and Bad Multiplicity. 
Here too we find the structural parallelism that pervades the problems of Good 
and Bad Finitude and Infinitude, of Good and Bad Unity and Multiplicity and ap-
pears in this case as Good and Bad Mobility and Immobility. Ultimately, the issue 
at stake here is just the One and the Many, but both of them in the movement 
of Becoming.
H) Mobility: The Mobile and the Immobile
H1) Refutation of the thesis ‘: x is of bad immobility’
H11) ADDITIONAL DEFINITIONS IN THE LT
Postulation
  GMob x w ∇y Txy Good Mobility 
   [GMob x: x is of good mobility.]
  GImb x w ∇y ¬ Txy Good Immobility 
   [GImb x: x is of good immobility.]
  BMob x w ¬ GMob x  Bad Mobility 
   [BMob x: x is of bad mobility.]
  BImb x w ¬ GImb x  Bad Immobility 
   [BImb x: x is of bad immobility.]
H12) Conceptual Correspondences 
Development
GMob x ¬ BMob x ∇y Txy ¬ Δy ¬ Txy Synthesis (A)
GImb x ¬ BImb x ∇y ¬ Txy ¬ Δy Txy Synthesis (T)
BMob x ¬ GMob x ¬ ∇y Txy Δy ¬ Txy Antithesis
BImb x ¬ GImb x ¬ ∇y ¬ Txy Δy Txy Thesis
H13) Theorem of the LT
 : GImb x           Good Immobility 
Demonstration
  1 : ∇y ¬ Txy    Non-transformation [LT]
  2 : GImb x     1 Good Immobility
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H14) The thesis
Refutation
  1 : GImb x  Good Immobility [LT]
    ⎡  2 :BImb x  Hypothetical Premise (Thesis)
    ⎢  3 : ¬ GImb x 1 Bad Immobility
    ⎢  4 : GImb x ∧ ¬ GImb x 
    ⎢   1,3 Logical Product 
    ⎢  5 : f  4 Supplementation
    ⎣  6  f   5 Elimination of the Assertion
  7 : ¬ (:BImb x) 1-6 Reduction to Absurdity
H2) Refutation of the antithesis ‘: x is of bad mobility’
H21) Theorem of the LT
 : GMob x   Good Mobility
Demonstration
  1 : ∇y Txy  Introduction of the Transformation [LBA]
  2 : GMob x   1 Good Mobility
H22) The antithesis
Refutation
  1 : GMob x   Good Mobility [LT]
    ⎡  2 : BMob x  Hypothetical Premise (Antithesis)
    ⎢  3 : ¬ GMob x  2 Bad Mobility
    ⎢  4 : GMob x ∧ ¬ GMob x  
    ⎢   1,3 Logical Product 
    ⎢  5 : f  4 Supplementation
    ⎣  6  f   5 Elimination of the Assertion
  7 : ¬ (:BMob x) 2-6 Reduction to Absurdity
H3) The synthesis of ‘: x is of good immobility’ and ‘: x is of good mobility’ 
Thesis : BImb x : x (existent or inexistent) 
   is of bad immobility.
Antithesis : BMob x : x (existent or inexistent) 
   is of bad mobility.
Synthesis 
(–) (T) : ¬ (:BImb x)
: Non (: x (existent or inexistent) 
   is of bad immobility).
Synthesis 
(–) (A) : ¬ (: BMob x)
: Non (: x (existent or inexistent) 
   is of bad mobility).
Synthesis 
(+) (T) : GImb x 
: x (existent or inexistent) 
   is of good immobility.
Synthesis 
(+) (A) : GMob x 
: x (existent or inexistent) 
   is of good mobility.
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H4) Some apparently paradoxical developments of the synthesis
H411
: BGmb x
: x is of good immobility.
H421
: GMob x
: x is of good mobility.
H412
: Δx GImb x
: Everything 
   is of good immobility.
H422
: Δx GMob x
: Everything 
   is of good mobility.
H413
: ∇x GImb x
: Something 
   is of good immobility.
H423
: ∇x GMob x
: Something 
   is of good mobility.
H414
: ¬ ∇x BImb x
: Nothing 
   is of bad immobility.
H424
: ¬ ∇x BMob x 
: Nothing 
   is of bad mobility.
H415
: ¬ Δx BImb x 
: Not everything 
   is of bad immobility.
H425
: ¬ Δx BMob x 
: Not everything 
   is of bad mobility.
1 2 Second part – Quantity
1 2 1 First chapter – Quantity
The difference between quantity and quality was explained previously. Quality 
is the first and immediate determination of Being; it is a Limit that limits and at the 
same time constitutes the Limited and the Unlimited, the Finite and the Infinite; it 
is a Being-for-itself that is for itself because it is also the Being-for-Other.
Since Being-for-itself is always also a Being-for-Other, the Limit between them 
is indifferent and flowing. It may be here just as it may as well be there. Determina-
tion is not fixed and, thus, completely determined, but flowing. It does limit, but 
one does not know exactly where, because it is something external to the categories 
that have been worked out so far. This indifference, this external character of the 
Limit that delimits Quality is called Quantity.
1 2 1 A Pure Quantity
The One repels and attracts itself at the same time. While it attracts itself and 
refers all other ones to itself, this Attraction is a form of continuity of the One that 
reiterates itself. This continuity is the immediate unity of the many ones: each One 
is outside of the other One, but all of them refer to the original One and originate 
in it. When it is said that each One is outside of the other, this already contains the 
characteristic of pure Quantity: partes extra partes. The emphasis is on the indeter-
mination of the undifferentiated unity that becomes ambiguous here: do we mean 
to express attraction or repulsion? Continuity or discontinuity?
But in order to better understand the issue, we anticipate the antithesis dis-
cussed below: the One that attracts itself also repels itself. This repulsion in which 
each One repels the other ones and posits itself as different from them is a second 
essential characteristic of Quantity: besides being continuous (first part of the 
antithesis), it is also discrete (second part of the antithesis). Although all the ones 
refer to and originate in the main One, each one of them is a separate and discrete 
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One. Thus we have continuous Quantity and discrete Quantity, which constitute 
each other.
 That is the reason why the arrow is still and moving at the same time. If we 
consider only the moment of continuity, the arrow enters an infinitely continuous 
space and will never come to a halt. If we consider only the moment of discontinuity, 
it does not move and will never reach the target: the still arrow. If we consider both 
aspects, the arrow crosses the space, which is continuous, but reaches the target, 
which is the moment of discontinuity. That is why Achilles wins the race, and the 
turtle does not.
 The thesis states: everything that was presupposed and must be reposited 
is pure quantity. – This thesis is false because when Quantity is conceived as pure it 
does not yet make explicit the two elements that constitute it, viz., continuity and 
discontinuity. Since only continuity is expressed, the thesis is false and Zeno’s and 
Kant’s antinomies emerge, which are not able to conciliate continuity and discon-
tinuity in Quantity.
1 2 1 B The continuous and discrete magnitude
When conceived as pure Quantity, Quantity is a false thesis because it is 
indeterminate, because the two elements that make it up are not made explicit, 
viz., continuity and discontinuity. The movement of unity of all ones in relation 
to the first One and the movement of dispersion in each One are different from 
all others.
The One that attracts itself also repels itself. This repulsion, in which each One 
repels the other ones and posits itself as different from them, is also an essential 
characteristic of Quantity; besides being continuous (first part of the antithesis), it 
is also discrete (second part of the antithesis). Although all the ones refer to and 
originate in the main One (continuity), each one of them is a separate and discrete 
One (discontinuity). Thus we have the continuous Magnitude (Grösse) and the 
discrete Magnitude, which constitute each other.
The antithesis states: everything that was presupposed and must be repos-
ited is continuous and discrete magnitude. – The antithesis is false because it does 
not express the way in which the continuous and the discontinuous, which are 
initially separate and opposed, are conciliated and reunified. This is only done in 
the synthesis.
1 2 1 C Limitation of Quantity
In the thesis and antithesis above we saw that Quantity too is split into con-
tinuity and discontinuity. What unifies these two opposed elements? How are two 
opposed and mutually excluding elements conciliated and reunified?
It is the Limit that separates and opposes them to each other. There must 
be a Limit that makes possible the opposition between the continuous and the 
discontinuous. This Limitation of Quantity is the synthesis that is looked for. The 
Limitation between the two opposite elements is also what unifies and reconciles 
them: continuity and discontinuity constitute and define each other and they can 
be conceived without contradiction only when they are taken together.
The synthesis states: everything that was presupposed and must be reposited 
is a Limitation of Quantity. – The synthesis is true because it expresses the unity 
between the indetermination of the thesis, viz., pure Quantity, and the continuous 
and discontinuous Magnitude.
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1 2 2 Second chapter – Quantum
 Quantum is first of all Quantity with a Determination, i.e., with a Limit. 
When Quantum is conceived with the Limit as the only determination, it is simply 
the Number (1 2 2 A). When Quantum is understood as the Limit that delimits plu-
rality, it is the extensive Quantum; it says how many unities it is delimiting. When 
Quantum is conceived as a unity that turns toward itself and fulfills itself as One, 
as Being-for-itself, it is the intensive Quantum, which indicates the quantitative 
degrees of this self-fulfillment (1 2 2 B). Quantum as the One and the Many in the 
realm of Quantity is also the quantitative Infinitude (1 2 2 C).
1 2 2 A Number
Quantity is here a Quantum and has a Limit, i.e., it is delimited both in its con-
tinuity and discontinuity. This Limit, however, is not located in a particular place; but 
wherever it is, it delimits Quantity and constitutes the One; in this sense it is the principle 
of continuity. Thus, this One is first of all the continuity of Quantity, which is one in and 
of itself. This One is, secondly, the principle of discontinuity, since the multiplicity of the 
many ones, which are different from each other, emerges from it. This One is, thirdly, 
the unity of continuity and discontinuity, because (a) it refers to itself in its unity, (b) it 
gives rise to the multiplicity of the many ones, which are, each one, different from the 
others, and (c) it gathers in itself both continuity and discontinuity.
When the three movements of the Quantum are posited and conceived simul-
taneously, we have the Number. The Number is the continuous and initial One, the 
series of many ones and the unity of this series. This leads us again to the problem 
of the good and bad Infinitude, since the numerical series is, on the one hand, 
infinite and can continue forever and, on the other, in its finitude it is determined 
and finite like this series. We will com back to this issue.
The thesis states: everything that was presupposed and must be reposited 
is Number. – This thesis is false, since it expresses the unity and multiplicity of the 
Quanta in an abstract manner. What is lacking here is the determination of the 
intensity or degree, which, as we saw, is part of the concept of Quantum.
1 2 2 B Extensive and intensive Quantum
Besides being continuous and discontinuous (see above), the Quantum can 
be extensive and intensive. When the Quantum is considered only in its numerical 
magnitude, it is extensive and asks only how many ones are within its limits; the 
answer here is always a determinate number of One, each one being different from 
the other. When the Quantum is considered only in its encompassing unity of many 
ones, it is intensive and indicates the degree. The degree does not tell how many 
ones are encompassed in the unity, but transforms the externality of the many 
ones into the internality of the degrees of intensity. – Both, however, constitute 
each other, because intensity too can be divided again and numbered when it is 
considered as discontinuous. In this way we obtain the numbering of the degrees of 
one single intensity, e.g., of heat. But both extension and intensity are in a process 
of Becoming, which gives rise to the problem of Infinitude.
The antithesis states: everything that was presupposed and must be reposited 
is an extensive and intensive quantum. – This antithesis is false too, because it left 
out the issue of Good and Bad Infinitude. Even when one talks about the Quantum 
in its extension and intensity, one must explicitly consider the issue of Infinitude.
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1 2 2 C Quantitative Infinitude
The Quantum is continuous and discontinuous, extensive and intensive. 
In both dimensions there emerges the already known and previously discussed 
problem of the Good and Bad Finitude, of the Good and Bad Infinitude, for the 
Quantum, in any one of the two dimensions, contains a progressus and a regressus 
ad infinitum. One cannot adequately understand the Quantum if it is not brought, 
in its continuous and discontinuous and in its extensive and intensive dimensions, 
to the issue of Finitude and Infinitude. This problem, which we have already dealt 
with in the realm of Quality, returns here in the realm of Quantity and requires a 
solution. The answer is relatively simple: it is in principle the same that we have 
already proposed when we dealt with the issue of Good and Bad Infinitude in 
the realm of Quality. Good Finitude and Good Infinitude are the same, for they 
are the two sides of the same coin. – In this context Hegel discusses extensively 
the problems of the foundation of mathematics, differential calculus, Kant’s anti-
nomies and others. Against the background that we have delineated here, these 
problems can and must be dealt with; this has, in fact, already occurred and still 
occurs in mathematics (Leibniz, Frege, Russell, Peano, etc.). But they cannot be 
discussed here, because each one of them would require an entire book just for 
itself, but they do not have to be dealt with here, since ultimately the solutions 
are contained in what has been presented so far.
The synthesis states: everything that was presupposed and must be reposited 
is quantitative infinitude. – The synthesis is true and reposits the same answer already 
given to the problem of Infinitude. There is a Bad Finitude and a Good Finitude; 
there is a Bad Infinitude and a Good Infinitude. Good Finitude is the same as Good 
Infinitude; both of them constitute each other.
1 2 3 Third chapter – The Quantitative Relation
The Quantum as of Good Finitude and Good Infinitude is the unity of both 
elements, quantity and quality. This unity is called relation or ratio, as the ancient 
ones used to say. 
Direct ratio exists if, with the growth of one element, the other element 
grows equally. A philosophically important example of direct and indirect ratio is 
found in the theological discussions about God’s transcendence and immanence. 
God’s transcendence and immanence are in a direct ratio (or relation) if, with the 
growth of one of them, the other one grows equally. Thus, the more transcendent 
God is, the more immanent God must be. If the kingdom of God is still to come 
(transcendence), then it is already here among us (immanence). In indirect ratio 
the opposite applies; the growth of one part implies the decrease of the other one. 
Thus, the more transcendent one conceives God to be, the less present (immanent) 
God is in this world.
Direct ratio is the thesis, indirect ratio is the antithesis and the relation of 
potency (Potenzialverhältnis) is the synthesis, according to Hegel. Below we will 
see what this means.
1 2 3 A Direct relation
Direct relation is the mere affirmative relation between the movement of 
two Quanta: when one of them grows, the other one grows too. The relation is 
immediate, direct and equal, always only in its positiveness.
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The thesis states: everything that was presupposed and must be reposited is 
a direct relation. – This thesis is false because it is one-sided, because it expresses 
only the positiveness, but not the negativeness, because it does not express the 
variety of relations that exists in the world of ideas and things.
1 2 3 B Indirect relation
Indirect relation negates direct relation and affirms the opposite. In the move-
ment between two Quanta, when one of them grows, the other one decreases. 
This relation is an indirect one, but it is mediated by negation and presents itself 
only in its negativeness.
The antithesis states: everything that was presupposed and must be reposited 
is an indirect relation. – This antithesis is false because it only expresses negative-
ness. It does not take into account the many direct relations that exist in the world 
of ideas and things.
1 2 3 C The relation of potency
Traditional interpreters of Hegel, led by the word “potency” (Potenz), look 
here for a mathematical relation similar to the potentiation that we know since the 
Greeks. Two in the second potency is four, four in the second potency is sixteen, and 
so forth. According to them, potency here means exactly the same as in arithmetic. 
But this interpretation is superficial and mistaken.
Hegel defines potency in this way: Potenz ist eine Menge von Einheiten, 
deren jede diese Menge selbst ist (Potency is a set of unities of which each one 
is this same set). The most common interpretation says that potency is a set of 
unities and that each one of these unities is the same. But the same as what? Is 
each unity the same as each one of the other unities? Or is each unity itself the 
same as the set that it constitutes? In the first case we have a banality: in the 
calculation of a second potency, one part is multiplied twice by itself; two in the 
second potency is four. In the second interpretation something completely new 
and apparently counter-intuitive appears: each unity, regardless of how many times 
it is potentiated, is always the same as the set of all unities. In mathematics this 
seems to be wrong. In Set Theory a class is only infinite if it is bijectable with a 
subclass of its own. In this case the whole is not larger than one of its (own) parts. 
In Teoría axiomática de conjuntos (2nd ed., Barcelona, Ariel, 1980, p. 115f.) Jesús 
Mosterín tells this delightful story: “Let us assume that a hotel with a finite number 
of rooms is completely occupied. If new customers arrive, there will be no place 
for them and they will not get a room. Let us now assume that the hotel has an 
infinity of rooms, as many as the natural numbers. If new customers arrive (even 
an infinite number of new customers), it will always be possible to receive them, 
even if the hotel is completely occupied. It will suffice, for instance, to invite the 
customers who already occupy it to move to the room with the double number 
of their present room. Thus, the guests of room 1 move to room 2, those of room 
2 to 4, those of 3 to 6, … those of n to 2n. After that, all of them will continue 
having a room (with even numbers), but an infinity of rooms (those with uneven 
numbers) will be free. This extraordinary property of hotels with infinite rooms is 
the property that all infinite classes (and only they) have of being bijectable with 
a subclass of their own. This property was used by Dedekind to define infinitude.” 
But here we are dealing with philosophy, rather than mathematics. What Hegel 
and we mean is perhaps much more profound and difficult, for it would apply 
even to finite classes: each part, even when it is potentiated, is the same as the 
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whole of which it is a part. The part continues to be a part, but besides that it is 
always the whole of which it is a part.
In this second interpretation we have a far-reaching philosophical proposition, 
viz., the relation between part and whole. The part, however much it is a part, is 
always also the whole. This relation is not the “potentiation” from mathematics, but 
something much more encompassing and much higher. This is the most intimate 
relation between part and whole.
The positive and the negative relation, which in the beginning are opposed 
and exclude each other, are now conciliated and find their synthesis. Increase and 
decrease are no longer opposites, because we are no longer dealing with the relation 
between two parts, but with the relation between part and whole. The part may 
perfectly well increase or decrease without the whole having to increase or decrease. 
The really philosophical quantitative relation is the one that, leaving mathematics 
behind it, deals with the relation between the part and the Universe, between the 
part and Totality in movement.
The synthesis states: everything that is presupposed and must be reposited 
is a relation of potency. – The synthesis is correct because it conciliates and unifies 
the direct and indirect relation. Direct and indirect ratio are the same here because 
they are unified on a level higher than the level of mathematics, on the level of the 
philosophy of the whole and its parts.
This means that each being, by being a Quantum, is both of Good Finitude 
and Good Infinitude. Quantity and quality begin to be conciliated here.
I)  Quality and Quantity
I1) Refutation of the thesis ‘: x is of bad quality’
I11) Additional Defi nitions in the LT
Postulation
  BQl x w ∇y ¬ Txy ∧ ∇y x ≠ y  Good Quality 
    [GQl x: x is of good quality.]
  GQt x w ∇y Txy   Good Quantity 
    [GQt x: x is of good quantity.]
  BQl x w ¬ GQl x   Bad Quality
    [BQl x: x is of bad quality.]
  BQt x w ¬ GQt x   Bad Quantity 
    [BQt x: x is of bad quantity.]
I12) Theorem of the LT
 : GQl x ↔ (∇y ¬ Txy ∧ ∇y x ≠ y ∧ ∇y ¬ Lxy ∧ ∇y ¬ Γxy)
       Good Quality
Demonstration
  1  GQl x w ∇y ¬ Txy ∧ ∇y x ≠ y 
       Good Quality
  2 : GQl x ↔ (∇y ¬ Txy ∧ ∇y x ≠ y) 
       1 Elimination of the Defi nition
  3 : p ↔ p   Identity
  4 : (∇y ¬ Txy ∧ ∇y x ≠ y) ↔ (∇y ¬ Txy ∧ ∇y x ≠ y)
       3 Replacement of p by ∇y ¬ Txy ∧ ∇y x ≠ y 
  5 : ∇y ¬ Lxy  Active Limitation 
  6 : ∇y ¬ Lxy ↔ v 5 Affi rmation by Biconditional
  7 : (∇y ¬ Txy ∧ ∇y x ≠ y) ↔ ((∇y ¬ Txy ∧ ∇y x ≠ y) ∧ v)
      4 Neutrality
  8 : (∇y ¬ Txy ∧ ∇y x ≠ y) ↔
  ↔ ((∇y ¬ Txy ∧ ∇y x ≠ y) ∧ ∇y ¬ Lxy)
      6,7 Exchange
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  9 : (∇y ¬ Txy ∧ ∇y x ≠ y) ↔
  ↔ (∇y ¬ Txy ∧ ∇y x ≠ y ∧ ∇y ¬ Lxy)
      8 Superfl uous Parentheses 
10 : ∇y ¬ Γxy  Passive Limitation
11 : ∇y ¬ Γxy ↔ v 10 Affi rmation by Biconditional
12 : (∇y ¬ Txy ∧ ∇y x ≠ y) ↔
  ↔ ((∇y ¬ Txy ∧ ∇y x ≠ y ∧ ∇y ¬ Lxy) ∧ v)
      9 Neutrality
13 : (∇y ¬ Txy ∧ ∇y x ≠ y) ↔
  ↔ ((∇y ¬ Txy ∧ ∇y x ≠ y ∧ ∇y ¬ Lxy) ∧ ∇y ¬ Γxy)
      11,12 Exchange
14 : (∇y ¬ Txy ∧ ∇y x ≠ y) ↔
  ↔ (∇y ¬ Txy ∧ ∇y x ≠ y ∧ ∇y ¬ Lxy ∧ ∇y ¬ Γxy)
      13 Superfl uous Parentheses 
15 : GQl x ↔ (∇y ¬ Txy ∧ ∇y x ≠ y ∧ ∇y ¬ Lxy ∧ ∇y ¬ Γxy)
      2,14 Hypothetical Syllogism 
I13) Theorem of the LT
 : GQt x ↔ (∇y Txy ∧ ∇y x = y ∧ ∇y Lxy ∧ ∇y Γxy)
      Good Quantity
Demonstration
  1  GQt x w ∇y Txy  Good Quantity
  2 : GQt x ↔ ∇y Txy 
      1 Elimination of the Defi nition
  3 : p ↔ p   Identity
  4 : ∇y Txy ↔ ∇y Txy 
      3 Replacement of p by ∇y Txy 
  5 : ∇y x = y  Non-void
  6 : ∇y x = y ↔ v 5 Affi rmation by Biconditional
  7 : ∇y Txy ↔ (∇y Txy ∧ v)
      4 Neutrality
  8 : ∇y Txy ↔ (∇y Txy ∧ ∇y x = y)
      6,7 Exchange
  9 : ∇y Lxy    Active Limitation 
10 : ∇y Lxy ↔ v 9 Affi rmation by Biconditional
11 : ∇y Txy ↔ ((∇y Txy ∧ ∇y x = y) ∧ v) 
      8 Neutrality
12 : ∇y Txy ↔ ((∇y Txy ∧ ∇y x = y) ∧ ∇y Lxy)
      10,11 Exchange
13 : ∇y Txy ↔ (∇y Txy ∧ ∇y x = y ∧ ∇y Lxy)
      12 Superfl uous Parentheses 
14 : ∇y Γxy   Passive Limitation 
15 : ∇y Γxy ↔ v 14 Affi rmation by Biconditional
16 : ∇y Txy ↔ ((∇y Txy ∧ ∇y x = y ∧ ∇y Lxy) ∧ v)
      13 Neutrality
17 : ∇y Txy ↔ ((∇y Txy ∧ ∇y x = y ∧ ∇y Lxy) ∧ ∇y Γxy)
      15,16 Exchange
18 : ∇y Txy ↔ (∇y Txy ∧ ∇y x = y ∧ ∇y Lxy ∧ ∇y Γxy)
      17 Superfl uous Parentheses 
19 : GQt x ↔ (∇y Txy ∧ ∇y x = y ∧ ∇y Lxy ∧ ∇y Γxy)
      2,18 Hypothetical Syllogism 
I14) Theorem of the LT
 : BQl x ↔ (Δy Txy ∨ Δy x = y ∨ Δy Lxy ∨ Δy Γxy)
      Bad Quality
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Demonstration
  1 : GQl x ↔ (∇y ¬ Txy ∧ ∇y x ≠ y ∧ ∇y ¬ Lxy ∧ ∇y ¬ Γxy)
      Good Quality
  2 : ¬ GQl x ↔ ¬ (∇y ¬ Txy ∧ ∇y x ≠ y ∧ ∇y ¬ Lxy ∧ ∇y ¬ Γxy)
      1 Inversion
  3 : ¬ GQl x ↔
  ↔ (¬ ∇y ¬ Txy ∨ ¬ ∇y x ≠ y ∨ ¬ ∇y ¬ Lxy ∨ ¬ ∇y ¬ Γxy)
      2 Superfl uous Parentheses and De Morgan
      (iteratively repeated) 
  4 : ¬ GQl x ↔
  ↔ (¬ ∇y ¬ Txy ∨ ¬ ∇y ¬ x = y ∨ ¬ ∇y ¬ Lxy ∨ ¬ ∇y ¬ Γxy)
      3 Otherness
  5 : ¬ GQl x ↔ (Δy Txy ∨ Δy x = y ∨ Δy Lxy ∨ Δy Γxy)
      4 Resolution of the Bound Assertion (4 times)
  6  BQl x w ¬ GQl x 
      Bad Quality
  7 : BQl x ↔ ¬ GQl x 
      6 Elimination of the Defi nition
  8 : BQl x ↔ (Δy Txy ∨ Δy x = y ∨ Δy Lxy ∨ Δy Γxy)
      7,5 Hypothetical Syllogism 
I15) Theorem of the LT
 : BQt x ↔ (¬ ∇y Txy ∨ ¬ ∇y x = y ∨ ¬ ∇y Lxy ∨ ¬ ∇y Γxy)
      Bad Quantity
Demonstration
  1 : GQt x ↔ (∇y Txy ∧ ∇y x = y ∧ ∇y Lxy ∧ ∇y Γxy)
      Good Quantity
  2 : ¬ GQt x ↔ ¬ (∇y Txy ∧ ∇y x = y ∧ ∇y Lxy ∧ ∇y Γxy)
      1 Inversion
  3 : ¬ BQt x ↔ (¬ ∇y Txy ∧ ¬ ∇y x = y ∧ ¬ ∇y Lxy ∧ ¬ ∇y Γxy)
      2 Superfl uous Parentheses and De Morgan
      (iteratively repeated)
  4  BQt x w ¬ GQt x Bad Quantity
  5 : BQt x ↔ ¬ GQt x 
      4 Elimination of the Defi nition
  6 : BQt x ↔ (¬ ∇y Txy ∧ ¬ ∇y x = y ∧ ¬ ∇y Lxy ∧ ¬ ∇y Γxy)
      5,3 Hypothetical Syllogism
I16) Conceptual correspondences 
Development
1 GQt x ¬ BQt x ∇y Txy Synthesis (A)
2 GQl x ¬ BQl x ∇y ¬ Txy ∧ ∇y x ≠ y Synthesis (T)
3 BQt x ¬ GQt x ¬ ∇y Txy Antithesis
4 BQl x ¬ GQl x Δy Txy ∨ Δy x = y Thesis
1 ∇y ¬ Txy ∧ ∇y x ≠ y ∧ ∇y ¬ Lxy ∧ ∇y ¬ Γxy Synthesis (A)
2 ∇y Txy ∧ ∇y x = y ∧ ∇y Lxy ∧ ∇y Γxy Synthesis (T)
3 Δy Txy ∨ Δy x = y ∨ Δy Lxy ∨ Δy Γxy Antithesis
4 ¬ ∇y Txy ∨ ¬ ∇y x = y ∨ ¬ ∇y Lxy ∨ ¬ ∇y Γxy Thesis
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I17) Theorem of the LT
 : GQl x      Good Quality
Demonstration
  1  GQl x w ∇y ¬ Txy ∧ ∇y x ≠ y 
        Good Quality
  2 : ∇y ¬ Txy    Transformation
  3 : ∇y x ≠ y    Plurality
  4 : ∇y ¬ Txy ∧ ∇y x ≠ y  2,3 Logical Product 
  5 : GQl x     1,4 Separation
I18) The thesis
Refutation
  1 : GQl x     Good Quality
 ⎡  2 : BQl x    Hypothetical Premise (Thesis)
 ⎢  3 : ¬ GQl x   2 Bad Quality
 ⎢  4 : GQl x ∧ ¬ GQl x 1,3 Logical Product 
 ⎢  5 : f     4 Supplementation
 ⎣  6  f      5 Elimination of the Assertion
  7 : ¬ (K BQl x)   2-6 Reduction to Absurdity
I2) Refutation of the antithesis ‘: x is of bad quantity’
I21) Theorem of the LT
 : GQt x      Good Quantity
Demonstration
  1  GQt x w ∇y Txy   Good Quantity
  2 : GQt x ↔ ∇y Txy  1 Elimination of the Defi nition
  3 : ∇y Txy     Introduction of the Transformation
  4 : GQt x     2,3 Separation
I22) The antithesis
Refutation
  1 : GQt x     Good Quantity
 ⎡  2 : BQt x    Hypothetical Premise (Thesis)
 ⎢  3 : ¬ GQt x   2 Bad Quantity
 ⎢  4 : GQt x ∧ ¬ GQt x 1,3 Logical Product 
 ⎢  5 : f     4 Supplementation
 ⎣  6  f      5 Elimination of the Assertion
  7 : ¬ (: BQt x)   2-6 Reduction to Absurdity
I3) The synthesis of ‘: x is of good quality’ and ‘: x is of good quantity’
Thesis : BQl x : x (existent or inexistent) 
   is of bad quality.
Antithesis : BQt x : x (existent or inexistent) 
   is of bad quantity.
Synthesis 
(–) (T) : ¬ (:BQl x)
: Non (: x (existent or inexistent) 
   is of bad quality).
Synthesis 
(–) (A) : ¬ (: BQt x)
: Non (: x (existent or inexistent) 
   is of bad quantity).
Synthesis 
(+) (T) : GQl x 
: x (existent or inexistent) 
   is of good quality.
Synthesis 
(+) (A) : GQt x 
: x (existent or inexistent) 
   is of good quantity.
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I4) Some apparently paradoxical developments of the synthesis
I411
: GQl x
: x is of good quality.
I421
: GQt x
: x is of good quantity.
I412
: Δx GQl x
: Everything 
   is of good quality.
I422
: Δx GQt x
: Everything 
   is of good quantity.
I413
: ∇x GQl x
: Something 
   is of good quality.
I423
: ∇x GQt x
: Something 
   is of good quantity.
I414
: ¬ ∇x BQl x
: Nothing 
   is of bad quality.
I424
: ¬ ∇x BQt x 
: Nothing
   is of bad quantity.
I415
: ¬ Δx BQl x 
: Not everything 
   is of bad quality.
I425
: ¬ Δx BQt x 
: Not everything 
   is of bad quantity.
1 3 Third part – Measure 
The dialectical development of the categories on Quantity showed that 
there is no Quantity without Quality, just as there is no Quality without Quantity. 
In the second part we saw that all categories that refer to Quantity always contain 
a qualitative element. Without this qualitative element Quantity would be a mere 
Non-being, a Nothing, void, undifferentiated, deprived of any determination. For 
Quantity to be Quantity, it must be the determinate negation of a Quality, i.e., 
Quantity is always the Quality that goes outside of itself, almost loses its sameness 
but never completely loses the identity with itself. Quantity is Quality outside of 
itself, an Internality that got lost in Externality. The classical phrase partes extra 
partes expresses both aspects. The word partes points to Quality; the word extra 
means negation, Non-identity, Externality, which is Quantity. For this reason in the 
treatment of Quantity we had to work out the concept of Quantum, a determinate 
quality that deals with the problems of Good and Bad Infinitude, of Good and Bad 
Finitude. The very concept of Quantum turns toward itself and discovers itself as 
Quantitative Relation. Quantitative Relation is just the Quantum that is conscious 
of itself, that discovers itself as self-relative and self-referential.
This would lead us again to the problem of Bad Infinitude, for a relation that is 
flexed upon itself, that is self-relation, loses, as it seems, all and any determination. One 
does not know where it begins and where it ends; one does not know how it delimits 
itself. Thus, with the category of Quantitative Relation we are back in the old problem 
of the vicious circle, which, besides being vicious for presupposing itself, is empty.
This is the problem that is discussed in the third and last part of the first book 
under the title of Measure. Measuring is a very special form of determining and 
specifying. One takes a determinate quantity, for instance a meter, and applies it 
to another determinate quantity, for instance a lasso; the successive application of 
the same meter – a determinate quantity – to the length of the lasso will determine 
how many meters this lasso has. The working lasso of an adult “gaucho” must 
have, for traditional and functional reasons, 26.4 meters. – We may take another 
determinate quantity, the foot. By using the length of the foot as a measuring 
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standard and by applying this standard to other determinate quantities, we can 
say that a house, for instance, is 27 feet in front by 90 feet long to the rear. – In 
both examples mentioned we took a determinate quantity, i.e., a Specific Quantity, 
but besides that, in a flexion of quantitative ratio itself, we are considering this 
determinate Quantum as a standard of measure and began to determine other 
determinate quantities, other Quanta, on the basis of how many times they contain 
the adopted standard. Measure is a further determination of the specific Quantum 
and Quantitative Relation because it establishes a sui generis kind of self-flexion 
and self-determination. This is the topic of this third part, which presents itself as 
a synthesis between Quality (first part) and Quantity (second part). The synthesis 
between both consists of an Identity that is flexed upon itself, applies itself as a 
standard to itself and is thus determined as self-flexion, i.e., as self-determination. 
This is the last category in the Logic of Being (first book) and makes the transition 
to the Logic of Essence (second book). Measure is a more sophisticated form of 
self-reference, of self-flexion, of reflexion. The Logic of Essence deals exclusively 
with these circular structures that, being vicious in the beginning, prove to be 
virtuous at a later point.
1 3 1 First chapter – Specific Quantity
1 3 1 A Specific Quantum
        Measure is a Specific Quantum that is taken as standard and, by 
being applied to other Specific Quanta, tells how many times one is contained 
in the other: the first in the latter ones (How many times do the Quanta to be 
measured contain the standard Quantum?) or the latter in the first one (How 
many Quanta to be measured are contained how many times in the standard 
Quantum?). I.e., ,how many feet is the front of the house? Or how many beans 
are on a stem?
The feature that stands out in this context is the empirical and arbitrary 
character of the standard of measure. From an a priori philosophical point of 
view, it is very clear what a Measure is: you take a determinate Quantum as 
standard and apply it on other determinate quantities. But his choice of a stand-
ard is empirical and arbitrary. Are we going to use as a standard of measure 
the inch, the hand, the foot, the yard, the metal bar kept in a well in Paris (the 
meter) or what? Even if – which is not the case – the foot were a measuring 
standard, the feet are empirical, a posteriori, and do not have precisely the same 
size. Which one then should we choose as a standard? Here the arbitrariness of 
the standard of measuring appears with total clarity. Measure and standard of 
measure are relational concepts: measuring consists of the self-application of the 
determinate Quantum to other determinate Quanta. They are a priori concepts. 
But the choice of the standard to be used, whatever it is, is something empiri-
cal, arbitrary, fruit of the tradition or social convention. The Specific Quantity 
that is the thesis here is arbitrary because it is indeterminate in itself; although 
it is called Specific Quantum, one does not know where it begins and ends. It 
continues to be indeterminate.
The thesis states: everything that was presupposed and must be reposited is 
the specific quantity. – The thesis is false because it is arbitrary, because it contains 
something outside of itself that tells where it begins and ends. But the categories 
of Logic in the Hegelian sense cannot be determined by something that is outside 
of the Universe, outside of the Totality in Movement.
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1 3 1 B The Specifying Measure
For a determinate Quantum to become a standard of measure, an act of choice 
is necessary: an act that chooses among several possibilities (inch, hand, foot, yard 
etc.) a determinate Quantum as being specific and turns it into the standard of 
measure. The standard of measure in itself is something arbitrary and empirical; but 
once it has been chosen as a standard, it acquires a scientific function and becomes 
the Specifying Measure. If the foot is chosen as standard of measure, all members 
of that particular culture and all its sciences must measure the quantities by say-
ing how many feet they have. The Quantum is no longer indeterminate; it became 
specific and concrete. But it still has its characteristic of arbitrariness. The Specifying 
Measure too, although it is a determinate Quantum, is something that receives its 
determination from outside itself. Such a concept cannot be the universal category 
of Logic, because it presupposes something outside of the Universe.
The antithesis states: everything that was presupposed and must be reposited is a 
specifying measure. – This antithesis is false too, since it contains a determining element 
that comes from outside of the Universe, from outside of the Totality in Movement.
1 3 1 C Being-for-itself in the Measure
To be understood philosophically, the Measure requires that the element 
that determines and specifies the Quantum must come from within the Universe, 
from within the Totality in Movement. For the measure to be able to be conceived 
as a philosophical category, the determination of the Specific Quantum and the 
Specifying Quantum has to come from within itself. In philosophy the Measure must 
be a Being-for-itself, i.e., the Measure must determine itself from within itself. The 
Measure must be something self-determined.
The synthesis states: everything that was presupposed and must be repos-
ited is a Measure that is a Being-for-itself. – The synthesis, which is true, expresses 
the philosophical need that the Quantum determines itself as Measure, without 
arbitrariness and without merely empirical conventions. The determination must 
come from within the Totality in Movement, from within the Measure itself while 
the latter is conceived as a philosophical category.
1 3 2 Second chapter – The Real Measure
1 3 2 A The Relation of Independent Measures
In the triad of the previous chapter the Measure was determined as a relation that 
exists between determinate and thus concrete Quanta. In the Measure a quantitative rela-
tion between at least two quantitative and concrete bodies is established. This Measure, 
although arbitrary, is autonomous, i.e., it rules itself (Being-for-itself). Obviously these 
various independent and autonomous measures are not isolated, for they constitute a 
network of mutual relations: they are a Relation of Independent Measures.
Here Hegel discusses first the relation between two measures. Secondly, 
Measure is considered as a series of measure relations. Thirdly, he deals with the 
measures that are called Wahlverwandtschaften (elective affinities). Hegel, Goethe 
and various authors of German Romanticism, as they did not know the atomic model 
of Niels and Rutherford that was discovered only later on, thought that certain sub-
stances had a special attraction to other substances. In their view, some persons felt 
especially attracted to other persons, which originated love relationships based on 
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elective affinities (see Goethe’s novel titled Wahlverwandtschaften). Today we know 
that the so-called affinities in physics and chemistry have their origin in the atomic 
structure and are ruled by laws that determine why an element or particle attracts 
or repels another one. There are cosmic forces of attraction and repulsion, such as 
electromagnetism, and others that seem only to attract (although not all physicists 
agree with this), such as the force of gravity. There is also the duplicity of particles, 
i.e., of the matter that we observe and of the black matter, of whose existence we 
are aware without knowing exactly what it is. In physics we are lacking the Great 
Unified Theory (GUT), which aims at unifying in a single theory the four big forces 
that we work with today. – From the merely philosophical point of view we cannot 
advance in this respect and have to wait for the results from physics.
The – false – thesis in this chapter on the Real Measure states that the Universe 
is composed of a Relation of Independent Measures.
The thesis states: everything that was presupposed and must be reposited is 
a relation of independent measures. – The falseness of the thesis is due to the fact 
that it only deals with determinate quantities, with the relation of specific Meas-
ures, with the series of relations of measure and with the Measures called elective 
affinities. What is lacking here are the knots that are formed between the relations 
of measure. What is lacking here is the unity that conciliates theses multiplicities.
1 3 2 B The knots between the relations of Measure
If the relations of Measure are not further specified and determined, they 
are dispersed in multiplicity. They are multiple, but do not express the unity that 
must keep them united among themselves and conciliated with themselves. Here 
the antithesis is constituted by the knots between the relations of Measure. Knot 
means, as the word itself expresses it, junction and thus unity. The thesis about 
the relation of independent measures is opposed by the antithesis about the knots 
between the relations of measure. The knots mean precisely the lacking unity.
The antithesis states: everything that was presupposed and must be reposited 
is a relation of knots between the relations of Measure. – This antithesis is false too. 
It is opposed to the thesis in the way unity is opposed to multiplicity. What is lack-
ing now is the unity between unity and multiplicity. But how are we to constitute 
a unity between the One and the Many of Real Measures? Hegel’s answer is a hard 
one and raises a problem that has to be dealt with: the Measureless.
1 3 2 C The Measureless
The Measureless is the attempt – the heroic attempt, as the Greeks say – to 
unify the relation of independent measures in their plurality with the knots between 
the relations of measure in their unity. The Measureless seems to be here the concilia-
tion between the One and the Many, because both are fused and disappear in it.
The synthesis states: everything that was presupposed and must be reposited 
is a measureless. – This synthesis is true because and to the extent that it unifies the 
One and the Many in the relations of Measure. In this respect it is a synthesis here. In 
the Measureless the One comes to the fore and the Multiple almost disappears.
But this synthesis immediately leaves its agglutinative position and becomes 
again a thesis to be worked on, for the Measureless, precisely because it is without 
measure, has sublated (aufheben) the element of Multiplicity to such an extent that 
the element of unity has almost disappeared in the indifferentiation of something 
which, having no Measure (Massloses), loses almost all its determinations. This last 
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synthesis is so unifying (as it sublates multiplicity) that it has not kept in a sufficiently 
explicit manner the multiplicity that it contains. Thus it becomes again a thesis and 
leads to the next, third and last, chapter: The Becoming of Essence.
The Measureless is in fact a synthesis; we find it in the Greek heroes. But it is 
at the same time its perdition. For without Measure the Greek hero leaves Epos, is 
no longer a hero and falls in the inexorable snare of Tragedy.
1 3 3 Third chapter – The Becoming of the Essence
1 3 3 A Absolute Indifference
Being is abstract indifference, where there is yet no determination; pure 
Quantity acquires some determination when it is conceived as Quantum and par-
ticularly as Measure, because in Measure determination becomes more conspicu-
ous. Nonetheless, the question that keeps returning and cannot be silenced is this: 
How can determination come from within the Universe, from within the Totality 
in Movement? Every time we think we can catch it, it escapes us again and comes 
from the outside. This also occurred in the case of the Measure, in the knots of the 
determinate measures. Thus we were led to another absurdity. If determination 
does not come from the outside, then the whole Universe, the whole Totality in 
Movement is a Measureless in which ultimately there is nothing really concrete and 
determinate. And where are we in our determination? Where are the multiple and 
variegated determinations of the Universe we live in?
The reasoning developed in the last triad, especially in the category of the 
Measureless, tells us that the Universe is itself absolute indifference to any deter-
mination. The Universe contains determinations, but it is none of them.
The thesis states: everything that was presupposed and must be reposited 
is absolute indifference. – This thesis is obviously false, for the Universe is in itself 
determinate, just as we are determinate in it. There is determination rather than 
absolute indifference. That is why the thesis is false.
1 3 3 B Indifference as the Inverse Relation of its Factors
So far we have looked for the determination of each category in a whole 
that is larger and richer than itself, in a whole of which it is a part. The determi-
nations that specify each category of this Logic – which is an Ontology – receive 
their determination from a whole which, from the point of view of its content, 
is larger and richer than the categories. In this sense, the determination of each 
category comes to it from the outside. Not from the outside of the Universe, 
because there is nothing outside of the Universe. But from the outside of its set 
of already explicitly developed contents, viz., of already reposited contents (see 
the unnumbered chapter in the beginning on presupposing and subsequent 
repositing). The further explicit development of each category adds something 
new to it, a new conceptual richness, i.e., a new determination. Now it is no 
longer possible to postpone this question: If the determinations that further 
characterize each category come from this richness of contents that is still hid-
den in the totality in movement, how can we apprehend and reposit them in 
the system? All Metaphysics in its history has tried to solve this question and 
thus has created the most diverse binomials, i.e., games of opposites. But these 
games of opposites have usually been ill-constructed because the relation’s op-
posites do not have the same weight and are not co-original; usually one of the 
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relation’s opposites has more weight and functions as the starting point, which 
is wrongly considered as absolute (essence and appearance, substance and ac-
cident, form and matter etc.) Thus the history of Metaphysics became a history 
of errors, since one of the members of the binomial – of the game of opposites 
– was considered as the really real reality (ontos on) and the other element of 
the binomial was relegated to a shadowy existence or at most to a secondary 
and auxiliary moment. Thus it is assumed that the really real reality is expressed 
by essence rather than by appearance, by form rather than my matter, by the 
substance rather than by the accident etc., which is a big mistake, as we shall 
see in the Logic of Essence.
The antithesis states: everything that was presupposed and must be reposited 
is indifference as the inverse relation of its factors. – The antithesis is false because 
it merely reverses the poles of the relation that exists in the midst of the thetical 
Indifference. The determination of one pole by the other one is a relation that can 
be reversed. Why do we not say – what are the reasons for not saying – that the 
really real reality is the accident rather than the substance? Appearance rather than 
essence? Matter rather than form?
The absolute Indifference, which is the false thesis, is opposed by the 
determination through an inversion of factors for the further determination 
of the categories. This antithesis is false too, since the two poles of the rela-
tion are mutually constituted and must be conceived together, for otherwise 
we are thrown from one to the other in an endless game. The attempt to 
determine the categories by taking one pole of the relation as the main and 
dominant, viz., determinant one leads us to the problem of inversion: Why 
don’t we start from the other pole and do the same? But there is a more seri-
ous and definitive argument: The relation can be correctly determined only by 
starting at the same time from the two poles that constitute it. Without this 
there is no relation that is originally relative, i.e., in which each pole really 
constitutes the other one. This is why the mere inversion of the poles proves 
to be a wrong antithesis.
1 3 3 C Transition to Essence
The history of philosophy is today the long and winding road on whose 
roadside lie the white skeletons of philosophical systems that have erred, gotten 
lost and died because they did not realize that in a philosophical system the two 
poles of the relations must be conceived and determined at the same time, one by 
the other, one constituting the other.
This gives rise immediately to the question whether this is not a vicious circle. 
Isn’t that precisely the error of the circulus vitiosus?
Yes and no. The second book of Hegel’s Science of Logic, which is perhaps 
the most critical work that has ever been written about the basic concepts of tra-
ditional philosophy, shows in a detailed way how the great systems erred precisely 
because they fell in this vicious circle. One by one, all the great systems are reviewed 
– without mentioning the authors’ names – and unmasked as vicious circles. – But 
is there a way out? Is there a way to get out of the vicious circle that pervades all 
our tradition? Hegel shows that there is in fact a way out: it is necessary to trans-
form the vicious circles into virtuous ones. And he does it brilliantly in most cases. 
In one case, however, in the dialectics of modalities, Hegel is at least ambiguous. 
In the development of the category of Absolute Necessity he is not clear, and the 
whole system takes on a character of necessitarianism that distorts it. From this 
point onwards, Hegel – as Spinoza did before him – moves almost always within 
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the parameters of systemic necessitarianism that renders free choice and thus true 
ethics impossible. – Precisely at this point we shall make a corrective interpreta-
tion of the system. We shall transform absolute necessity, which is considered by 
Spinoza and Hegel as a hard necessity that does not admit counterfacts and applies 
to Logic, Mathematics and certain parts of Philosophy, into a soft necessity that 
allows counterfacts and applies to the subatomic world, to the Theory of Evolu-
tion of living beings and societies and particularly to what we call Ethics and Law. 
The soft necessity is the major law of the system, it is the larger set within which 
lies the hard necessity that is smaller and less encompassing. Soft necessity will be 
the great law, the really universal law that applies to the whole Universe and rules 
Totality in Movement.
The synthesis states: everything that was presupposed and must be reposited 
is the transition to essence. – The synthesis is in fact the transformation of vicious 
circles into virtuous ones. This is the true synthesis that opens the doors for us to 
the second book of the Science of Logic.
J) Active Measure
Previous Note on the Measure, both Active (item J) and Passive (item K): 
The relation of measure (both active and passive) is defined by the relation of identity. 
Thus all properties of the relation of identity apply to the relation of measure (both 
active and passive), such as exchange, reflexivity, symmetry, transitivity. Exchange 
would mean the following: if x measures y, then if x is P, then y is P. This means that 
what measures and what is measured have the same properties. In other words, 
“the form (the properties) of the recipient (of what measures) and the form of the 
received (of what is measured) are identical.”
J1) Refutation of the thesis ‘: x measures everything’
J11) Additional Defi nition
Postulation
  Mxy w x = y      Mxy: x measures y 
J12) Theorem of the LT
 : ∇y ¬ Mxy       Measure
Demonstration
  1 : ∇y x ≠ y      Plurality
  2  Mxy w x = y     Measure
  3 : Mxy ↔ x = y    2 Elimination of the Defi nition
  4 : ¬ Mxy ↔ ¬ x = y   3 Inversion
  5 : ¬ Mxy ↔ x ≠ y    4 Otherness
  6 : Δy (¬ Mxy ↔ x ≠ y)  5 Introduction of the Generalizing Assertion
  7 : ∇y ¬ Mxy ↔ ∇y x ≠ y  6 Distribution of the Bound Assertion
  8 : ∇y ¬ Mxy     7,1 Separation
J13) The thesis
Refutation
  1 : ∇y ¬ Mxy     Measure
 ⎡  2 : Δy Mxy     Hypothetical Premise (Thesis)
 ⎢  3 : ¬ ∇y ¬ Mxy   2 Resolution of the Bound Assertion
 ⎢  4 : ∇y ¬ Mxy ∧ ¬ ∇y ¬ Mxy 
 ⎢        1,3 Logical Product
 ⎢  5 : f       4 Supplementation
 ⎣  6  f       5 Elimination of the Assertion
  7 : ¬ (: Δy Mxy)    2-6 Reduction to Absurdity
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J2) Refutation of the antithesis ‘: x measures nothing’
J21) Theorem of the LT
  : Mxx      Measure
Demonstration
  1  Mxy w x = y    Measure
  2  : Mxy ↔ x = y   1 Elimination of the Defi nition
  3  : Mxx ↔ x = x   2 Replacement of x by y 
  4  : x = x     Refl exivity
  5  : Mxx      3,4 Separation
J22) Theorem of the LT
  : ∇y Mxy     Measure
Demonstration
  1  : ∇y x = y    Non-void
  2  Mxy w x = y    Measure
  3  : Mxy ↔ x = y   2 Elimination of the Defi nition
  4  : Δy (Mxy ↔ x = y)  3 Introduction of the Generalizing Assertion
  5  : ∇y Mxy ↔ ∇y x = y 4 Distribution of the Bound Assertion
  6  : ∇y Mxy     5,1 Separation
J23) The antithesis
Refutation
  1  : ∇y Mxy     Measure
 ⎡  2  : ¬ ∇y Mxy   Hypothetical Premise (Antithesis)
 ⎢  3  : ∇y Mxy ∧ ¬ ∇y Mxy 
 ⎢       1,2 Logical Product
 ⎢  4  : f     3 Logical Product
 ⎣  5  f      4 Elimination of the Assertion
  6  : ¬ (: ¬ ∇y Mxy)  2-5 Reduction to Absurdity
J3) The synthesis of ‘: x measures something’ and ‘: x does not measure something’
Thesis : Δy Mxy 
: x (existent or inexistent) 
   measures everything 
      (existent or inexistent).
Antithesis : ¬ ∇y Mxy 
: x (existent or inexistent) 
   measures nothing 
      (existent or inexistent).
Synthesis 
(–) (T) : ¬ (: Δy Mxy)
: Non (: x (existent or inexistent) 
   measures everything 
      (existent or inexistent).
Synthesis 
(–) (A) : ¬ (: ¬ ∇y Mxy)
: Non (: x (existent or inexistent) 
   measures nothing 
      (existent or inexistent).
Synthesis 
(+) (T) : ∇y ¬ Mxy 
: x (existent or inexistent) 
   does not measure something 
      (existent or inexistent).
Synthesis 
(+) (A) : ∇y Mxy 
: x (existent or inexistent) 
   measures something 
      (existent or inexistent).
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J4) Some apparently paradoxical developments of the synthesis
J421
: Mxx
: x measures x.
J412
: ∇y ¬ Mxy
: x does not measure 
something.
J422
: ∇y Mxy
: x measures something.
J413
: Δx ∇y ¬ Mxy
: Everything does not 
measure something.
J423
: Δx ∇y Mxy
: Everything measures 
something.
J414
: ∇x ∇y ¬ Mxy
: Something does not 
measure something.
J424
: ∇x ∇y Mxy
: Something measures 
something.
J415
: ¬ ∇x Δy Mxy 
: Nothing measures 
everything.
J425
: ¬ ∇x Δy ¬ Mxy 
: Nothing does not 
measure everything.
J416
: ¬ Δx Δy Mxy 
: Not everything measures 
everything.
J426
: ¬ Δx Δy ¬ Mxy 
: Not everything does not 
measure everything.
K) Passive Measure
K1) Refutation of the thesis ‘: x is measured by everything’
K11) Additional Defi nition 
Postulation
  Wxy w Myx      Wxy: x is measured by y 
K12) Theorem of the LT
  : Wxy ↔ Mxy     Measure
Demonstration
  1  Wxy w Myx     Measure
  2  : Wxy ↔ Myx    1 Elimination of the Defi nition
  3  Mxy w x = y     Measure
  4  : Mxy ↔ x = y    3 Elimination of the Defi nition
  5  : Myx ↔ y = x    4 Replacement of x by y and of y by x 
  6  : x = y ↔ y = x    Symmetry
  7  : Myx ↔ x = y    6,5 Hypothetical Syllogism 
  8  : Mxy ↔ Myx    4,7 Hypothetical Syllogism
  9  : Wxy ↔ Mxy    2,8 Hypothetical Syllogism
K13) Theorem of the LT
  : ∇y ¬ Wxy       Measure
Demonstration
  1  : ∇y ¬ Mxy     Measure
  2  : Wxy ↔ Mxy    Measure
  3  : ¬ Wxy ↔ ¬ Mxy   2 Inversion
  4  : Δy (¬ Wxy ↔ ¬ Mxy)  3 Introduction of the Generalizing Assertion
  5  : ∇y ¬ Wxy ↔ ∇y ¬ Mxy 
         4 Distribution of the Bound Assertion
  6  : ∇y ¬ Wxy     5,2 Separation
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K14) The thesis
Refutation
  1 : ∇y ¬ Wxy    Measure
 ⎡  2 : Δy Wxy    Hypothetical Premise (Thesis)
 ⎢  3 : ¬ ∇y ¬ Wxy  2 Resolution of the Bound Assertion
 ⎢  4 : ∇y ¬ Wxy ∧ ¬ ∇y ¬ Wxy 
 ⎢       1,3 Logical Product
 ⎢  5 : f      4 Supplementation
 ⎣  6  f      5 Elimination of the Assertion
  7 : ¬ (: Δy Wxy)   2-6 Reduction to Absurdity
K2) Refutation of the antithesis ‘: x is measured by nothing’
K21) Theorem of the LT
 : ∇y Wxy     Measure
Demonstration
  1 : ∇y Mxy     Measure
  2 : Wxy ↔ Mxy   Measure
  3 : Δy (Wxy ↔ Mxy)  2 Introduction of the Generalizing Assertion
  4 : ∇y Wxy ↔ ∇y Mxy 3 Distribution of the Bound Assertion
  5 : ∇y Wxy     4,1 Separation
K22) The antithesis
Refutation
  1 : ∇y Wxy     Measure
 ⎡  2 : ¬ ∇y Wxy   Hypothetical Premise (Antithesis)
 ⎢  3 : ∇y Wxy ∧ ¬ ∇y Wxy 
 ⎢       1,2 Logical Product
 ⎢  4 : f      3 Logical Product
 ⎣  5  f      4 Elimination of the Assertion
  6 : ¬ (: ¬ ∇y Wxy)   2-5 Reduction to Absurdity
K3) The synthesis of ‘: x is measured by something’ and ‘: x is not measured by something’
Thesis : Δy Wxy 
: x (existent or inexistent) 
   is measured by everything 
      (existent or inexistent).
Antithesis : ¬ ∇y Wxy 
: x (existent or inexistent) 
   is measured by nothing 
      (existent or inexistent).
Synthesis 
(–) (T) : ¬ (: Δy Wxy)
: Non (: x (existent or inexistent) 
   is measured by everything 
      (existent or inexistent).
Synthesis 
(–) (A) : ¬ (: ¬ ∇y Wxy)
: Non (: x (existent or inexistent) 
   is measured by nothing 
      (existent or inexistent).
Synthesis 
(+) (T) : ∇y ¬ Wxy 
: x (existent or inexistent) 
   is not measured by something 
      (existent or inexistent).
Synthesis 
(+) (A) : ∇y Wxy 
: x (existent or inexistent) 
   is measured by something
      (existent or inexistent).
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K4) Some apparently paradoxical developments of the synthesis
L) Measurabilty: the (com)measurable and the i(ncom)measurable
L1) Refutation of the thesis ‘: x is of bad measurability’
L11) Additional Defi nitions in the LT
Postulation
  GMm x w ∇y Wxy   Good Measurability 
        [GMm x: x is of good measurability.]
  GImm x w ∇y ¬ Wxy  Good Immeasurability 
        [GImm x: x is of good immeasurability.]
  BMm x w ¬ GMm x   Bad Measurability 
        [BMm x: x is of bad measurability.]
  BImm x w ¬ GImm x  Bad Immeasurability 
        [BImm x: x is of bad immeasurability.]
L12) Conceptual Correspondences
Development
GMm x ¬ BMm x ∇y Wxy ¬ Δy ¬ Wxy Synthesis (A)
GImm x ¬ BImm x ∇y ¬ Wxy ¬ Δy Wxy Synthesis (T)
BMm x ¬ GMm x ¬ ∇y Wxy Δy ¬ Wxy Antithesis
BImm x ¬ GImm x ¬ ∇y ¬ Wxy Δy Wxy Thesis
L13) Theorem of the LT
 : GImm x     Good Immeasurability 
Demonstration
  1 : ∇y ¬ Wxy    Measure [LT]
  2 : GImm x     1 Good Immeasurability
K421
K412 K422
K413 K423
K414 K424
K415 K425
K416 K426
: ∇y ¬ Wxy
: x is not measured by 
something.
: Δx ∇y ¬ Wxy
: Everything 
   is not measured by 
something.
: ∇x ∇y ¬ Wxy
: Something 
   is not measured by 
something.
: ¬ ∇x Δy Wxy 
: Nothing 
   is measured by 
everything.
: ¬ Δx Δy Wxy 
: Not everything 
   is measured by 
everything.
: Wxx
: x is measured by x.
: ∇y Wxy
: x is measured by 
something.
: Δx ∇y Wxy
: Everything 
   is measured by 
something.
: ∇x ∇y Wxy
: Something 
   is measured by 
something.
: ¬ ∇x Δy ¬ Wxy 
: Nothing 
   is not measured by 
everything.
: ¬ Δx Δy ¬ Wxy 
: Not everything 
   is not measured by 
everything.
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L14) The thesis
Refutation
  1 : GImm x     Good Immeasurability [LT]
 ⎡  2 :BImm x    Hypothetical Premise (Thesis)
 ⎢  3 : ¬ GImm x   1 Bad Immeasurability
 ⎢  4 : GImm x ∧ ¬ GImm x 
 ⎢       1,3 Logical Product
 ⎢  5 : f      4 Supplementation
 ⎣  6  f      5 Elimination of the Assertion
  7 : ¬ (:BImm x)   1-6 Reduction to Absurdity
L2) Refutation of the antithesis ‘: x is of bad measurability’
L21) Theorem of the LT
 : GMm x      Good Measurability
Demonstration
  1 : ∇y Txy     Introduction of the Transformation [LBA]
  2 : GMm x      1 Good Measurability
L22)  The antithesis
Refutation
  1 : GMm x      Good Measurability [LT]
 ⎡  2 : BMm x    Hypothetical Premise (Antithesis)
 ⎢  3 : ¬ GMm x    2 Bad Measurability
 ⎢  4 : GMm x ∧ ¬ GMm x 
 ⎢       1,3 Logical Product 
 ⎢  5 : f      4 Supplementation
 ⎣  6  f      5 Elimination of the Assertion
  7 : ¬ (:BMns x)   2-6 Reduction to Absurdity
L3) The synthesis of ‘: x is of good immeasurability’ and ‘: x is of good measurability’
Thesis : BImm x : x (existent or inexistent) 
   is of bad immeasurability.
Antithesis : BMm x : x (existent or inexistent) 
   is of bad measurability.
Synthesis 
(–) (T) : ¬ (:BImm x)
: Non (: x (existent or inexistent) 
   is of bad immeasurability).
Synthesis 
(–) (A) : ¬ (: BMm x)
: Non (: x (existent or inexistent) 
   is of bad measurability).
Synthesis 
(+) (T) : GImm x 
: x (existent or inexistent) 
   is of good immeasurability.
Synthesis 
(+) (A) : GMm x 
: x (existent or inexistent) 
   is of good measurability.
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L4) Some apparently paradoxical developments of the synthesis
L411
: GImm x
: x is 
   of good immeasurability.
L421
L412
: Δx GImm x
: Everything is 
   of good immeasurability.
L422
L413
: ∇x GImm x
: Something is 
   of good immeasurability.
L423
L414
: ¬ ∇x BImm x
: Nothing is 
   of bad immeasurability.
L424
L415
: ¬ Δx BImm x 
: Not everything is 
   of bad immeasurability.
L425
: GMm x
: x is 
   of good measurability.
: Δx GMm x
: Everything is 
   of good measurability.
: ∇x GMm x
: Something is 
   of good measurability.
: ¬ Δx BMm x 
: Not everything is 
   of bad measurability.
: ¬ ∇x BMm x 
: Nothing is 
   of bad measurability.
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M) Synopses
M1) Ideas, Postulates, Theses, Antitheses and Syntheses
‘X (Y)’ means ‘X (intimately related with Y)’.
IDEAS POSTULATES
THESES & 
ANTITHESES
SYNTHESES 
(T)
SYNTHESES 
(A)
A 
BOUND ASSERTION
[LBA]
A’ 
IDENTITY
B
TRANSFORMATION 
: Txy → x ≠ y 
: ∇y Txy 
: Δy Txy 
: ¬ ∇y Txy 
: ¬ Txx 
: ∇y ¬ Txy : ∇y Txy 
C (A’)
OTHERNESS 
x ≠ y w ¬ x = y : Δy x = y : ¬ ∇y x = y : ∇y x ≠ y 
: x = x 
: ∇y x = y 
D
ACTIVE LIMITATION 
Lxy w x ≠ y : Δy Lxy : ¬ ∇y Lxy 
: ¬ Lxx 
: ∇y ¬ Lxy : ∇y Lxy 
E (D)
PASSIVE LIMITATION 
Γxy w Lyx : Δy Γxy : ¬ ∇y Γxy 
: ¬ Γxx 
: ∇y ¬ Γxy : ∇y Γxy 
F (E)
GOOD FINITUDE, 
GOOD INFINITUDE, ...
GFin x w ∇y Γxy 
GInf x w ∇y ¬ Γxy
BFin x w ¬ GFin x 
BInf x w ¬ GInf x 
: BInf x 
: BFin x 
: ¬ Γxx 
: ∇y ¬ Γxy 
: GInf x 
: ∇y Γxy 
: GFin x
G (C)
GOOD UNITY, 
GOOD PLURALITY, ...
GUn x w ∇y x = y 
GPl x w ∇y x ≠ y
BUn x w ¬ GUn x 
BPl x w ¬ GPl x 
: BPl x 
: BUn x 
: ∇y x ≠ y 
: GPl x 
: x = x 
: ∇y x = y 
: GUn x
H (B)
GOOD MOBILITY, 
GOOD IMMOBILITY, ...
GMob x w ∇y Txy 
GImb x w ∇y ¬ Txy 
BMob x w ¬ GMob x 
BImb x w ¬ GImb x 
: BImb x 
: BMob x 
: ¬ Txx 
: ∇y ¬ Txy 
: GImb x 
: ∇y Txy 
: GMob x
I (B) (C) (D) (E)
GOOD QUALITY, 
GOOD QUANTITY, 
...
GQl x w 
   w ∇y ¬ Txy ∧ 
      ∧ ∇y x ≠ y 
GQt x w ∇y Txy
BQl x w ¬ GQl x 
BQt x w ¬ GQt x 
: BQl x 
: BQt x 
: ¬ Txx 
: ∇y ¬ Txy 
: ∇y x ≠ y 
: GQl x 
: ∇y Txy 
: x = x 
: ∇y x = y 
: GQt x 
J (A’)
 ACTIVE MEASURE 
Mxy w x = y : Δy Mxy : ¬ ∇y Mxy : ∇y ¬ Mxy 
: Mxx 
: ∇y Mxy 
K (J)
PASSIVE MEASURE 
Wxy w Myx : Δy Wxy : ¬ ∇y Wxy : ∇y ¬ Wxy 
: Wxx 
: ∇y Wxy 
L (K)
GOOD 
MEASURABILITY, 
GOOD 
IMMEASURABILITY, ...
GMm x w ∇y Wxy 
GImm x w ∇y ¬ Wxy 
BMm x w ¬ GMm x 
BImm x w ¬ GImm x : BImm x : BMm x 
: ∇y ¬ Wxy 
: GImm x 
: Wxx
: ∇y Wxy 
: GMm x 
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M2) Developments of Conceptual Correspondences
F12) Between Good and Bad Finitudes and Infinitudes
GFin x ¬ BFin x ∇y Γxy ¬ Δy ¬ Γxy Synthesis (A)
GInf x ¬ BInf x ∇y ¬ Γxy ¬ Δy Γxy Synthesis (T)
BFin x ¬ GFin x ¬ ∇y Γxy Δy ¬ Γxy Antithesis
BInf x ¬ GInf x ¬ ∇y ¬ Γxy Δy Γxy Thesis
G12) Between Good and Bad Unities and Pluralities
GUn x ¬ BUn x ∇y x = y ¬ Δy x ≠ y Synthesis (A)
GPl x ¬ BPl x ∇y x ≠ y ¬ Δy x = y Synthesis (T)
BUn x ¬ GUn x ¬ ∇y x = y Δy x ≠ y Antithesis
BPl x ¬ GPl x ¬ ∇y x ≠ y Δy x = y Thesis
H12) Between Good and Bad Mobilities and Immobilities
GMob x ¬ BMob x ∇y Txy ¬ Δy ¬ Txy Synthesis (A)
GImb x ¬ BImb x ∇y ¬ Txy ¬ Δy Txy Synthesis (T)
BMob x ¬ GMob x ¬ ∇y Txy Δy ¬ Txy Antithesis
BImb x ¬ GImb x ¬ ∇y ¬ Txy Δy Txy Thesis
I16) Between Good and Bad Quantities and Qualities
1 GQt x ¬ BQt x ∇y Txy Synthesis (A)
2 GQl x ¬ BQl x ∇y ¬ Txy ∧ ∇y x ≠ y Synthesis (T)
3 BQt x ¬ GQt x ¬ ∇y Txy Antithesis
4 BQl x ¬ GQl x Δy Txy ∨ Δy x = y Thesis
1 ∇y ¬ Txy ∧ ∇y x ≠ y ∧ ∇y ¬ Lxy ∧ ∇y ¬ Γxy Synthesis (A)
2 ∇y Txy ∧ ∇y x = y ∧ ∇y Lxy ∧ ∇y Γxy Synthesis (T)
3 Δy Txy ∨ Δy x = y ∨ Δy Lxy ∨ Δy Γxy Antithesis
4 ¬ ∇y Txy ∨ ¬ ∇y x = y ∨ ¬ ∇y Lxy ∨ ¬ ∇y Γxy Thesis
L12) Between Good and Bad Measurabilities and 
Immeasurabilities
GMm x ¬ BMm x ∇y Wxy ¬ Δy ¬ Wxy Synthesis (A)
GImm x ¬ BImm x ∇y ¬ Wxy ¬ Δy Wxy Synthesis (T)
BMm x ¬ GMm x ¬ ∇y Wxy Δy ¬ Wxy Antithesis
BImm x ¬ GImm x ¬ ∇y ¬ Wxy Δy Wxy Thesis
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M3) General Scheme for Unreflexive Relations
P: Premise   HP: Hypothetical Premise   RA: Reduction to Absurdity
M4) General Scheme for Reflexive Relations
P: Premise   HP: Hypothetical Premise   RA: Reduction to Absurdity
THESIS 
: ¬ Rxx  P 
: ∇y ¬ Rxy 
 ⎡ : Δy Rxy HP
 ⎢  ···   ···   ··· 
 ⎣  f 
: ¬ (: Δy Rxy) RA 
ANTITHESIS 
: ∇y Rxy  P 
 ⎡  : ¬ ∇y Rxy HP
 ⎢  ···   ···   ··· 
 ⎣  f 
: ¬ (: ¬ ∇y Rxy) RA
SYNTHESIS 
Positive Part 
Logical Law 
Refuting the Thesis
Logical Law 
Refuting the Antithesis
: ∇y ¬ Rxy : ∇y Rxy 
Negative Part
Metalogical Law 
of the Refuted Thesis
Metalogical Law 
of the Refuted Antithesis
: ¬ (:Δy Rxy) : ¬ (: ¬ ∇y Rxy)
THESIS 
: ∇y ¬ Rxy  P
               ⎡  : Δy Rxy HP
⎢  ···   ···   ···
               ⎣  f
: ¬ (: Δy Rxy) RA 
ANTITHESIS 
: Rxx  P
: ∇y Rxy
               ⎡  : ¬ ∇y Rxy HP
               ⎢  ···   ···   ···
               ⎣  f
: ¬ (: ¬ ∇y Rxy) RA
SYNTHESIS 
Positive Part 
Logical Law 
Refuting the Thesis
Logical Law 
Refuting the Antithesis
: ∇y ¬ Rxy : ∇y Rxy 
Negative Part 
Metalogical Law 
of the Refuted Thesis
Metalogical Law 
of the Refuted Antithesis
: ¬ (:Δy Rxy) : ¬ (: ¬ ∇y Rxy)
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